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Chapter 14
Access to Digital Information: 
Gift or Right?
Margaret Ann Wilkinson*
A. INTRODUCTION
There are different factors involved in creating the intellectual property 
environment within which digital information transactions take place in a 
networked world. The most important is the attitude of the governments of 
the various nation states in which aspects of the transactions occur. These 
attitudes, in turn, shape, and are also shaped by, the second factor involved, 
international agreements. The third factor is the activity of intellectual 
property owners. Together these three create the environment within which 
users experience both digital and non-digital information access to informa-
tion. That environment, however, is not the same for each nation state, nor 
does the environment necessarily remain static: for each nation state, the 
copyright environment reflects a complex interplay between the three fac-
tors. This paper will explore the role of “open source” and “open access” 
movements in Canada and in the United States within the context of the 
three factors because the blend of the three in the two jurisdictions is dif-
ferent and therefore creates two different environments for access to digital 
information. 
The dominance, among the three factors, of the role of the govern-
ments of nation states has been clearly asserted in the Internet environment 
as the Internet has developed and matured. Despite early notions that the 
*  Research assistance for this paper was provided by law students Vanessa Bacher 
and Ann Chmielowski. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Digital 
Copyright in a User-Generated World: Knowledge Policy for the Twenty-first Cen-
tury Conference, held at The University of Western Ontario in April 2007.
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law would be somehow different in the online environment than in the 
offline environment,1 nation states have demonstrated their control in this 
new realm2 — although, as in other areas of law where transactions cross 
jurisdictional boundaries, more than one state at a time can claim jurisdic-
tion in a particular situation.3 This paper will focus on copyright, a historic 
form of content control that has been virtually universally adopted by gov-
ernments as appropriate for the digital telecommunications environment. 
Recalling that copyright laws give the owners of copyright interests certain 
legislated controls over uses of material that are defined as being “in copy-
right,” it will become apparent from this paper that, while the open access 
movement, fuelled as it is by the decisions of copyright owners, appears to 
have an important and vigorous role to play in the American context, in 
Canada the role for the movement is much less obvious. The two different 
approaches, Canadian and American, in providing accessibility to digital 
content will be tested for “fit” in terms of the international obligations of 
the two states. Finally, it will be recommended that those copyright hold-
ers interested in providing free access to material in the Canadian context 
consider exploring the opportunity to create a collective.
B. THE DECISIONS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS
The owner of a copyright interest in a work or other subject matter that is 
in copyright controls various uses of the work, sound recording, performer’s 
performance, or broadcast and may therefore make any one of a number of 
decisions regarding further uses of that information. In the case of a work 
such as an article or a book, seven possibilities present themselves:
1) Assign all the copyright interest to a “traditional” publisher.4
1 John Perry Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copy-
rights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know about Intellectual Property Is 
Wrong)” Wired (March 1994), online: www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.
ideas.html.
2 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v. Canadian 
Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 [Tariff 22].
3 Tariff 22, ibid. 
4 A traditional publisher, in this context, means a publisher who, following the 
industrial model of publishing, requires the assignment of an author’s copyright 
interest in return for giving that author access, through the publisher’s machinery 
for publishing (originally the printing press itself ), to readership. 
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2) Assign some aspects of the copyright interest to “non-traditional” pub-
lishers — those publishers who will publish without insisting upon a 
full assignment of the copyright holder’s interest in the work.
3) Retain copyright and grant permissions on a case-by-case basis as re-
quested by potential users.
4) Retain copyright and grant certain permissions for use to all users or to 
certain classes of user.
5) Retain copyright and join with other copyright holders in arrange-
ments of collective administration of rights.
6) Retain copyright and do not take any steps to enforce the interests.
7) Renounce copyright.
The first option was really the only option available to an author who 
wished to reach any audience up until the late twentieth century. The au-
thor, in this historic industrial model, would have had no possibility of 
self-publishing, particularly to a large audience, because of the expense in-
volved in owning and operating the machinery of reproduction. The pub-
lisher would seek full assignment of the copyright in return for the high risk 
involved in expending the money to publish where the popularity of a pub-
lication was usually unknown until the expenses had been incurred. The 
original industrial reasons for this model of publication have been eroded 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, first by the spread of photo-
copying and then by the spread of digital technology. However, traditional 
publishers continue to play a role in publishing — and in no small measure 
due to the value that users place upon the imprimatur of a known press as 
an indicator of quality. This first choice, therefore, is still a choice frequently 
made by authors and copyright holders.
The consequences of this first choice, and an environment in which it 
is entrenched for a number of reasons, can be seen in the academic sphere.5 
In Canada, copyright is generally taken to belong to professors when they 
create scholarly works.6 During the period of the gestation and writing of 
5 See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Copyright in the Context of Intellectual Property: 
A Survey of Canadian University Policies” (2000) 14:2 Intellectual Property Journal 
141 [Wilkinson, “Survey of Canadian Policies].
6 In a case such as Dolmage v. Erskine (2003), 23 C.P.R. (4th) 495 (Ont. S.C.J.), involv-
ing the parties at The University of Western Ontario, the capacity of professors (and 
not the university) to hold copyright was assumed. In Australia, however, faculty 
employed by the university, working within the scope of their employment, were 
found not to hold copyright; the university owned it: Victoria University of Technol-
ogy v. Wilson (2004), 60 I.P.R. 392 (Vic. S.C.). In the Canadian context, it is difficult 
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the work, the university has borne the costs of the professor’s scholarship. 
In order to be published in established peer-reviewed journals, it has been 
necessary, at least in the past, to assign the copyright in the work to the 
publisher of the academic journal.7 Then, in order to bring the work back 
into the scholarly environment of the university, it has been necessary for 
the university, usually through its library system, to purchase a journal sub-
scription from the publisher.8
The second option, partial transfer of copyright, for certain purposes, 
in exchange for publication, is an option for the copyright holder where 
the target publication makes this option available. It is slowly becoming 
more available in certain venues, for example, in university-level academic 
publishing.
The third option, retaining all copyright interests and giving per-
mission on a case-by-case basis, is becoming more possible for copyright 
owners, particularly with the increased possibilities for self-publication fos-
tered by the digital telecommunications environment — although, as will 
to be certain what the outcome would be of litigation that put this assumption 
squarely to the test. Under s. 13(3) of the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
C-42, as amended, copyright is first owned by the employer when the author is in an 
employment relationship. What is meant by “employment” is not further defined in 
the Copyright Act. Therefore, presumably, this would be determined with reference 
to labour law in Canada. Under the labour relations statutes of the various Canadian 
provinces, a group can only engage in collective bargaining where an employer-
employee relationship exists. See Donald D. Carter et al., Labour Law in Canada 
(NewYork: Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 44 and 250. Since over half of Can-
ada’s university faculty have unionized over the past several decades (64 universities 
out of roughly 78 in Canada (see online: www.caut.ca/pages.asp?page=128) (see “The 
Register of Post-Secondary and Adult Education Institutions,” online: www.statcan.
ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5075&lang=en&db=IMDB
&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2)), it would appear difficult to argue that Canadian univer-
sity faculty are not employees, and if they are employees, copyright would be owned 
by the universities, absent contracts to the contrary. 
7 The peer-review process that is an entrenched aspect of promotion and tenure in the 
university system has reinforced, traditionally, the power of the scholarly presses: the 
prestigious journals are sought-after by faculty for publication and these are often 
associated with presses that demand assignment of all copyright interests. Although 
this situation is slowly changing, particularly in science and medicine, there is still 
domination by traditional presses.
8 As will become evident below, universities in Canada pay a third time when they 
purchase licences for reprography from copyright collectives whose members are the 
publishers of the journals. See Wilkinson, “Survey of Canadian Policies,” above note 5.
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be discussed further, it is difficult and time-consuming to police copyright 
interests as an individual or corporation not usually engaged in publishing.
The fourth option, retaining all copyright interests and giving blanket 
permissions for certain uses or to certain classes of users, is the foundation 
for the Creative Commons licensing movement. It is also one option that 
governments can choose to create for their own creations. Although, as dis-
cussed below, it is not a choice available to many American governments, 
due to other policy decisions of the governments themselves, it is a choice 
available to Canadian governments. Canada’s Copyright Act9 contains spe-
cial provisions for government creations but does affirm, at the same time, 
that governments in Canada hold copyright in works.10 Various provincial 
governments have given blanket permissions for use of various copyrighted 
works held by them to be used.11 The federal government, by regulation, has 
given the following permission:
•	 Anyone may, without charge or request for permission, reproduce
 » enactments,
 » consolidations of enactments,
 » decisions, or
 » reasons for decisions
•	 Provided
 » reasonable diligence is used in ensuring accuracy, and
 » no representation of the copy as official is made.12
This copyright permission is only for reproduction of certain works, not 
for other uses (such as translation) or for all works held in copyright by the 
Canadian federal government.
The fifth option for copyright holders is to retain their copyrights and 
join with others in collective administration of their copyrights. This option 
 9 Copyright Act, above note 6.
10 Copyright Act, ibid., s. 12.
11 Neither is there uniformity across the provinces about what permissions are given 
or how they are given. Some, like the federal permission, are given in regula-
tions — others, like Ontario, are in administrative manuals and are less permissions 
than they are instructions to employees not to enforce copyright interests in certain 
circumstances (see the sixth option discussed herein). See E. Prokopieva, “Crown 
Copyright Policy in Provinces and Territories of Canada” (2003, rev. 2007 by Ann 
Chmielowski) in Margaret Ann Wilkinson, ed., assisted by Vanessa Bacher, Law 
462: Cases and Materials on the Law of Intellectual Property, 2007–2008, vol. 2 (Lon-
don, ON: University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law, 2007) at 267–73.
12 Paraphrased from S.I./97-5 (8 January 1997), C. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 131, No. 1.
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is far more commonly selected by copyright holders in Canada13 than it is by 
those in the US. The reasons for this difference between decisions of copy-
right holders in the two countries lie in choices made by the governments 
of Canada and the US that will be further discussed in the next section.
The sixth option, retaining copyright but not taking steps to enforce 
the interests is, in fact, a very frequently selected option by copyright hold-
ers: enforcing copyright can be time-consuming and expensive. However, 
this option is not one that can be relied upon by users, as will be further 
discussed below.
Copyright legislation does not provide for “renunciation” of copyright 
interests, but presumably someone who “gives up” their copyright would 
have no control over subsequent uses of the work14 and could not exploit 
the potential of the copyright monopolies for economic value in the fu-
ture — other than in competition with any others who have decided to ex-
ploit the work. The seventh option is also one that is unreliable from the 
point of view of users: it is not clear that a copyright holder’s “renouncing” 
can be relied upon should that copyright holder subsequently change her or 
its mind and decide to enforce copyright against a particular user. 
Meanwhile, concomitant with the decisions available to copyright 
holders, users of information can make any one of a series of decisions when 
faced with an environment involving copyright:
1) users can use materials that are not works covered by copyright;
2) users can make use of materials in ways not forming part of the copy-
right holders’ rights bundle;
3) users can use materials in ways that do form part of the copyright hold-
ers’ rights bundle but are excepted by governments from the purview of 
the copyright holders’ exercise of their rights; and
4) users can use materials in ways that do form part of the copyright hold-
ers’ rights bundle but for which they have been given permission by the 
copyright holders through
i) copyright holders’ collectives, or
ii) permissions of copyright holders given in advance (open content 
licensing or Creative Commons), or
iii) permissions negotiated directly, from time to time, with copyright 
holders.
13 The Copyright Board of Canada maintains a list of Canadian copyright collectives: 
see online: www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/index-e.html.
14 Other than through the exercise of moral rights.
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It is only in the case of the fourth category of decision by users that the 
choices being made by the copyright holders, described above, become rel-
evant to the availability of information for users. That is, where materi-
als are not covered by copyright, or are not being used in ways governed 
by copyright, or are being used in ways permitted to users by law despite 
copyright interests, no action of a copyright holder can affect the activities 
of users.15
C. THE ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY IN NATIONAL LIFE
In any of the first four cases of decisions that can be made by copyright 
holders, as discussed above (assigning all the copyright, assigning part of 
the copyright, retaining the copyright but permitting certain uses on a 
case-by-case basis, and retaining the copyright but granting certain blan-
ket permissions),16 the copyright holder has a second decision to make: to 
seek compensation from users for the assignment or permission or to give 
it freely. If the copyright holder is not a government but is rather from the 
private sector, then a decision to give the copyright interest or permission 
away freely is a form of philanthropy — a gift to users.
Philanthropy plays a large role in many countries — and Canada and the 
US are no exception.17 However, philanthropy is proportionately far more 
15 As will be discussed further below, when governments enlarge the scope of any of 
the first three categories available to users, the opportunity of rightsholders to affect 
the environment of access for users is correspondingly diminished.
16 Where a copyright holder has chosen the fifth option, having a copyright collect-
ive administer the copyright holder’s rights, the decision about whether to charge 
for uses or not is part of the administration of the collective and is no longer an 
individual decision of the rightsholder. Where a copyright holder has chosen the 
sixth course, to refrain from enforcing the copyright interest, that choice necessarily 
means the copyright holder will not be compensated for uses — and the implications 
are the same where the copyright holder attempts to renounce the copyright interest 
(the seventh option).
17 Both countries have a shared heritage based in the English tradition of philan-
thropy that developed in Tudor times, when it became standard for gentry to leave 
grand gifts to their communities. See David Owen, English Philanthropy 1660–1960 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964). See also Peter 
Dobkin Hall, “Philanthropy (United States)” in John M. Herrick & Paul H. Stuart, 
eds., Encyclopedia of Social Welfare History in North America (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2005) at 272–74. In the early colonies that later comprised Canada, the British 
tradition of philanthropy held sway in Upper and Lower Canada (later, roughly, 
Ontario and Quebec) but the Maritime colonies took government action by enact-
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important in the American context than in the Canadian.18 Much that is cre-
ated through philanthropy in the US is achieved through government action 
in Canada. As Michael Hall and Keith Banting point out, some distinctive 
features of Canadian experience do stand out. For example, the greater 
role that the state has played in the development of economic and social 
life throughout Canadian history, in comparison with the pattern south 
of the border [in the United States] and in many other countries, is clearly 
reflected in the sources of funding of the nonprofit sector.19
In the US, on the other hand, there is a deep-seated avoidance of govern-
ment involvement in daily life.20 Although the economic conditions of the 
twentieth century softened this anti-government stance to some degree,21 
there is still a national preference for philanthropy rather than government 
social assistance.22
It is perhaps not surprising that, given this history of philanthropic 
activity, the open source software movement began in the US during the 
1970s.23 The open source software movement followed upon the “revelation” 
ing poor law legislation. See Janice Harvey, “Philanthropy (Canada)” in Herrick & 
Stuart, ibid. at 268–69.
18 Charities and nonprofit organizations in Canada rely much more heavily upon 
federal government funding than do comparable organizations in the United States, 
which rely much more on private philanthropy. See Michael Hall & Keith Banting, 
“The Nonprofit Sector in Canada: An Introduction” in Keith Banting, ed., The Non-
profit Sector in Canada: Roles and Relationships (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 2000) 1 at 2 [Hall & Banting].
19 Hall & Banting, ibid at 16. 
20 After the American Civil War, support for the nonprofit sector became central to 
American conservative ideology — and it was thought that the problems of pov-
erty and disadvantage could be solved completely by the private sector. See Lester 
Salamon, “The Nonprofit Sector at a Crossroads: The Case of America” (1999) 10:1 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 5.
21 The New Deal in 1932 was a turning point in the relationship between private and 
public life in the United States. Private philanthropy was joined by government in 
meeting the needs of the disadvantaged and social bureaucracy “mushroomed.” See 
Judith Sealander, Private Wealth and Public Life: Foundation Philanthropy and the 
Reshaping of American Social Policy from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) at 244.
22 Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Endangered Sector (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979) at 25–48.
23 David Bretthauer, “Open Source Software: A History” (2002) 21:1 Information, 
Technology and Libraries 3. Richard Stallman, who worked in the Artificial Intel-
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in law that software ownership and control lay within the sphere of intel-
lectual property.24 Once ownership of rights in software was established in 
law, a reaction began that saw creators develop a system of not-for-profit 
control in the software environment that “paralleled” the exploitation by 
the for-profit sector of software developments. As computers and telecom-
munications technology were increasingly able to handle content, it became 
apparent that intellectual property, with its attendant ownership controls, 
was following the importation of this content into the online and digital 
environment. This has led, in turn, to the genesis of the open access move-
ment in the US.25 One dominant form of the open access movement is the 
Creative Commons licensing system. That system has spread from the US 
into other jurisdictions, including Canada.26 But will it be as successful at 
its objects outside the US, as it appears to be within? Is the open access ap-
ligence Lab at MIT during the 1970s and 1980s, does not actually identify himself 
with the Open Source movement but is, nonetheless, considered its originator.
24 In Canada, this “revelation” occurred when all levels of court hearing the case of 
Apple Computer Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd. found that software came within 
the existing definition of literary work in the Copyright Act and therefore was in 
copyright for the life of the author plus fifty years as soon as original software was 
written. See (1986), [1987] 1 F.C. 173 (T.D.), additional reasons (1987), 12 F.T.R. 287 
(T.D.), var’d (1987), [1988] 1 F.C. 673, aff’d [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209. For further certain-
ty, Parliament, during the course of the appeals in that litigation, added “computer 
programs” to the definition of “literary work” in s. 2 of the Copyright Act, above note 
6, and further defined “computer program” in s. 2 as “a set of instructions or state-
ments, expressed, fixed, embodied or stored in any manner, that is to be used dir-
ectly, or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a specific result” (An Act to 
Amend the Copyright Act and to Amend other Acts in consequence thereof, R.S.C. 1985 
(4th Supp.), c. 10). In Canada, computer programs per se are not subject matter that 
is patentable (see Schlumberger Ltd. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner) (1981), [1982] 
1 F.C. 845 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1981] 2 S.C.R. xi, although 
computerization can be a novel, unobvious, and useful invention or improvement in 
an “art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter” and therefore can 
be a material element in a patent (see, for example, Re Motorola Inc. Patent Applica-
tion No. 2,085,228 (1998), 86 C.P.R. (3d) 71 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.)). In 
the US, however, software can be the subject of both copyright and patent, provided 
that the originality requirement is satisfied in the case of copyright and the other 
patentability tests for a patent are satisfied (see, for example, State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (U.S. 
Fed. Cir. 1998)).
25 The Creative Commons initiative started as an American nonprofit, registered in 
Massachusetts, in 2002. See online: http://creativecommons.org.
26 As at August, 2007, it offers licences in thirty-eight countries. See ibid.
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proach, as developed through the Creative Commons approach, a good fit 
in all jurisdictions? Is it necessary, for example, in Canada? If there is a need 
in Canada, is open access the best way to fill this need? 
D. THE DECISIONS OF GOVERNMENTS
The scope and availability of the various choices for copyright holders just 
described are directly affected by the decisions of national governments in 
respect of copyright. Of course, the environment of access to information 
for users is also shaped by these decisions. A few years ago, American schol-
ar Pamela Samuelson created a map of the public domain situated within 
the realm of intellectual property27 and reflecting American intellectual 
property law, but a map drawn from the Canadian perspective, while simi-
lar, remains distinctly different.28 The differences are created both by what 
is and is not included in copyright in each country and also, where there are 
copyright interests involved, by what exceptions or users’ rights (to use the 
Canadian terminology) are available in each country.
In the first place, copyright is a creation of government. Without the 
statutory creation of copyright, copyright holders would not have a mon-
opoly interest about which to make decisions. A prime example is the case 
of copyright interests and the governments themselves. In Canada, as men-
tioned above, crown copyright is recognized in the Copyright Act: the copy-
right legislation of the US, however, explicitly bars the American federal 
government from holding copyright in any of its creations.29 
In the US, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)30 consider-
ably enlarged the scope of the American copyright. On the other hand, in 
Canada, not only has legislation modelled on the American DMCA not 
been passed by the legislature,31 but also the courts have resisted the inclu-
27 Pam Samuelson, “Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities” 
(2003) 66 Law and Contemp. Probs. 147.
28 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “National Treatment, National Interest, and the Public 
Domain” (2003–2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal 23.
29 17 USC § 105. And many American states have followed suit — although these are 
examples of choice 7, discussed above (copyright holders renouncing their copy-
rights), since the state governments cannot legislate directly in the area of copyright 
(as the provincial governments in Canada cannot).
30 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stats. 2860. Sec-
tion 1201 contains anti-circumvention provisions.
31 Databases are protected under the general copyright regime in Canada where the 
selection and arrangement of the material meets the originality requirement for 
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sion of data, facts, or ideas per se in copyright. In 2002, it was held that 
where the software for performance monitoring systems can only be created 
in one way in order to perform its function, then the expression of the idea 
of the software is merged with the idea itself and therefore the expression 
can have no protection in copyright. As the Ontario Court of Appeal put it,
if an idea can be expressed in only one or in very limited number of ways, 
then copyright of that expression will be refused for it would give the ori-
ginator of the idea a virtual monopoly on the idea. In such a case, it is said 
that the expression merges with the idea and thus is not copyrightable.32
Canada was the first country to legislate in the area of moral rights 
when they were first included in an international intellectual property in-
strument.33 Since 1988, the moral rights in Canada have explicitly included 
the right of paternity (the right to be associated with the work as the au-
thor chooses, whether by name, pseudonym, or anonymously), the right of 
integrity in the work, and the right not to have the work associated with 
products, services, causes or institutions that would prejudice the author’s 
honour or reputation.34 In the US, on the other hand, there is no explicit 
mention of any moral rights protection in copyright legislation and the 
moral rights aspect of copyright is virtually ignored.35
copyright (see Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc. 
(1997), [1998] 2 F.C. 22 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
xv) — and then only to the extent that the whole or a substantial portion of the 
selection or arrangement of the data is at issue in an infringement suit (see s. 3 of the 
Canadian Copyright Act, above note 6). There was an attempt to introduce Amer-
ican-style protections in Bill C-60, tabled 20 June 2005, particularly ss. 27 and 34, 
but that bill failed to pass before Parliament was dissolved. Bill C-61 of 2008, below 
note 85, similarly failed to pass.
32 The court of first instance had dismissed the claim of copyright infringement, 
Delrina Corp. v. Triolet Systems Inc. (1993), 47 C.P.R. (3d) 1 at 41 (Ont. Ct. Gen. 
Div.). The Court of Appeal refused to overturn the judgment: (2002), 156 O.A.C. 
166 (C.A.), additional reasons [2002] O.J. No. 3729 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
refused (2002), 305 N.R. 398n.
33 Copyright Act Amendment Act, 1931, 21–22 Geo. V., c. 8, s. 5. 
34 See Copyright Act, above note 6, ss. 2, 14.1, 14.2, 28.1, and 28.2. For a discussion of the 
role of each of these in society and the relationship between each of them and the 
moral rights provisions of the Berne Convention, see Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The 
Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection” (2006) 1 Michigan State L. Rev. 193.
35 Congress was somehow persuaded, on the eve of signing the Berne Convention in 
1989, that American law generally already provided sufficient protection for moral 
rights and that there was no need to amend the copyright legislation. See Brian E. 
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In addition to these differences between the two countries in the scope 
of copyright, there are also important differences in the scope of the excep-
tions to the rights of rightsholders in intellectual property. In the US, one 
very important area of exception is the “fair use” provision.36 Again, Can-
ada has a similar but very different set of provisions in its copyright legisla-
tion — the fair dealing provisions.37 
In Canada the fair dealing provisions, together with the other excep-
tions to the rights of copyright holders set out in the Copyright Act, have 
been described by the Supreme Court of Canada as embodying a set of 
“users’ rights.”38 The Chief Justice, in the unanimous decision of the Court 
in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, wrote:
The language [of the fair dealing provision] is general. “Dealing” con-
notes not individual acts, but a practice or system. This comports with 
the purpose of the fair dealing exception, which is to ensure that users are 
not unduly restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted 
works.39 
Moreover, wrote the Chief Justice, under the fair dealing sections of the 
Copyright Act, “Research must be given a large and liberal interpretation in 
order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”40 Thus, through 
its judgments in copyright rendered between 2002 and 2006, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has come to the position that Canada’s Copyright Act
 1) permits agents for users who are exercising fair dealing rights and those 
agents can claim those fair dealing protections;
2) permits claims of fair dealing even where there are special-interest ex-
ceptions: not-for-profit “libraries, archives and museums” or “educa-
tional institutions”;
Koeberle, “Play It Again, Samantha? Another Argument for US Adherence to Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention” (1989) 27 Duq. L. Rev. 609. Most commentators agree 
that moral rights protection is almost completely absent in the United States: see, 
for example, Edward J. Damich, “The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis 
for the Protection of Moral Rights of Authors” (1988) 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1; and David R. 
Grant, “Rights of Privacy: An Analytical Model for the Negative Rights of Attribu-
tion” (1992) Utah L. Rev. 529.
36 17 USC § 107.
37 Copyright Act, above note 6, ss. 29, 29.1, & 29.2.
38 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at paras. 12 & 13 
[CCH v. Law Society].
39 CCH v. Law Society, ibid. at para. 63.
40 CCH v. Law Society, ibid. at para. 51.
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3) must be interpreted to embody research, private study, criticism, news 
reporting, review, and other provisions limiting the rights of rights-
holders as representing rights for users;
4) does not cover information in records where there is not a demonstra-
tion of skill and judgment because such information does not lie within 
an expression included in copyright and therefore is not controlled by 
a copyright holder: mere copying of information does not create an 
original work; and
5) can encompass alternative means of compensating rightsholders 
through such mechanisms as the levy on blank tapes and the related 
private copying exemption.
Canada, therefore, finds itself in a position where many activities of users 
can be exempt from the copyright holder’s control. For example, it is un-
likely, but possible, that every act done with copyright material within an 
educational institution, which would otherwise fall within the purview 
of the copyright holder, will fall under a users’ right (or exception): first, 
all educational institution employees can act as agents for their students 
and the students themselves have fair-dealing rights to private study, re-
search, criticism, review, and news reporting (the latter three items with 
acknowledgement where possible); second, the employees of educational 
institutions themselves have fair-dealing rights for their own private study, 
research, criticism, review, and news reporting; and thirdly, activities by 
members of non-profit educational institutions (though not those of for 
profit educational institutions) that fall outside fair dealing may still be 
exempted under the exceptions provided for educational institutions in the 
Canadian Copyright Act.41 Indeed, if not all, certainly the majority of the 
activities within an educational institution will be found to be exempt from 
the control of copyright holders.42
Another distinguishing feature of the Canadian copyright environment 
is the extent to which the Canadian legislation encourages the collective 
administration of copyrights. Beginning in 1988, the Canadian govern-
41 Copyright Act, above note 6, ss. 29.4–30.
42 See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Know-
ledge: Access and Copyright in Education and Libraries” in Michael Geist, ed., 
In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2005) 331 [Wilkinson, “Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge”]. This 
question is one with which the Canadian Copyright Board is currently wrestling in 
the proceeding concerning Access Copyright’s Elementary and Secondary School 
Tariff 2005–2009.
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ment has actively encouraged this approach by making extensive legislative 
provisions to smooth this avenue of connection between copyright hold-
ers and users: collectives of copyright holders43 have been exempted from 
the purview of Canada’s antitrust or anti-combines legislation44 and the 
power of the Copyright Board of Canada to act as mediator for users and 
collectives has been increased.45 These collectives for the holders of Can-
adian rights have, in turn, created reciprocal agreements with collectives 
in other countries, including the US. However, in general, American col-
lective rights organizations do not represent the percentage of rightsholders 
that are represented by their Canadian counterparts.46
Canada’s collective licensing regime has been strengthened by Parlia-
ment and adopted by a wide range of copyright owners to such an extent 
that it may now be the case that Canada should be classified as a country 
with an extended repertoire or extended licensing regime.47 Under such a 
regime, collectives are deemed to represent all rightsholders of a given class, 
43 It should be noted that the Copyright Act, above note 6, does not exempt collectives 
of copyright users from the purview of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, as 
amended. This point has been fully investigated by Cathy Maskell, Consortia Activity 
in Academic Libraries: Anti-competitive or in the Public Good? (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Western Ontario, 2006). See also Catherine A. Maskell, “Consortia: 
Anti-competitive or in the Public Good?” (2008) 26(2) Library Hi-Tech, 164–83.
44 Copyright Act, ibid., s. 70.5 exempts collectives from the purview of the Competition 
Act, ibid.
45 Copyright Act, ibid., s. 70.12ff.
46 See Glynn Lunney, “Copyright Collectives and Collecting Societies: The United 
States Experience,” in Daniel Gervais, ed., Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
2006) 311; where it is explained that collectives per se probably violate American 
antitrust legislation and the question is raised of how long the groups in the US that 
are organized as copyright collectives can last, given that reality. On the other hand, 
“collecting societies” such as the Copyright Clearance Centre in the US, where the 
copyright holders set their own terms and conditions for copyright permissions, 
but the administration is handled for them through the society, would seem to be 
compliant with antitrust requirements.
47 As pointed out by Daniel Gervais in “The Changing Role of Copyright Collect-
ives,” in Daniel Gervais, ed., Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 
ibid., c. 1. One indication in support of this position is the provision in s. 38.2 that a 
copyright holder not affiliated with a collective is limited, in an infringement lawsuit 
for unauthorized reprography against an educational institution or library, archive, 
or museum (as these institutions are defined in s. 2 of the Copyright Act, above note 
6), to damages equal to the royalties that would have been payable by the infringer 
to the collective.
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not just those who have chosen to actively become members of the collect-
ive. Users, where such a regime is in place, can then rely completely upon a 
licence from the collective. If Canada is not operating under such a regime, 
then users must be aware that permissions or licences from the collective 
will only be effective insofar as rightsholders are members of the collective 
or are members of collectives that have reciprocal arrangements with the 
licensing collective.
The Canadian environment surrounding open access initiatives thus 
differs from the American in at least five ways: 
1) much of Canada’s public information is held in crown copyright, where-
as in the US, governments are frequently barred from holding copyright; 
2) Canada has not enacted the same level of sui generis database and anti-
circumvention legislation that the US Congress has; 
3) Canada has actively legislated in the area of moral rights whereas the 
US has not; 
4) Canada has strong language from its Supreme Court now characteriz-
ing as “users’ rights” what are still regarded as “exceptions” to the rights 
of rightsholders in the American context (and clearly articulating an 
expansive scope for fair dealing in Canada); and
5) Canada has a well-developed system of collective rights administration 
for copyrights. 
These differences put both users and copyright holders in Canada in differ-
ent positions than their counterparts in the US. Thus the options available 
to both users and copyright holders in Canada differ from those available 
in the US. As will be further discussed, these differences would appear to 
make the selection of philanthropic donation by copyright holders, through 
participation in open access initiatives like the Creative Commons move-
ment, less central to meeting the needs of users in Canadian society.
 But first these differences observed between Canada and the United 
States must be placed in their constitutional and international contexts to 
see whether they are differences that are likely to linger, or differences that 
will be obliterated shortly by government action.
1) Nation States, Governments, and Constitutions
The composition of government in a particular sovereign state is determined 
by its constitution, whether written or otherwise. In the area of copyright, 
there is a significant difference between the US and Canada in constitu-
tional terms. The US Congress made huge changes in copyright law toward 
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the end of the twentieth century. Perhaps inevitably, this engendered con-
stitutional challenge in the courts. Consequently, the US Supreme Court 
issued a landmark judgment articulating the constitutional position of 
copyright in the US. There has not been a similar judgment issued by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
In the US Constitution, the power to legislate in the area of copyright 
is articulated as follows: “The Congress shall have power . . . to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”48
Congress, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, extended 
the general term of copyright from twenty-eight years (with a possible re-
newal period of a further twenty-eight years) first to the life of the author 
of a work plus fifty years, and then to the life of the author plus seventy 
years. (It should be noted that, throughout this period and even still, the 
period of copyright in general in Canada has remained the life of the author 
plus fifty years.) In 2003, in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft,49 this second ex-
tension was challenged on constitutional grounds, invoking the American 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech, the First Amendment.50 The 
US Supreme Court held that because of the particular wording of article 
8 of the Constitution, Congress had been given wide powers to create an 
appropriate balance between access to information and the monopolies and 
controls inherent in copyright ownership. A majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the copyright extensions passed by Congress had not overstepped 
its constitutional capacity under this wide wording in article 8.51
In Canada, on the other hand, the constitutional ability of the federal 
government to legislate in the area of copyright is articulated in the one 
word “copyright.”52 Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court, were it ever to be 
48 US Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
49 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), rehearing denied 538 U.S. 916, 123 S. Ct. 1505 
(Mem. 2003).
50 US Const. amend. I.
51 Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the court in which Rehnquist C.J., 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas JJ., joined. Stevens and Breyer JJ. 
filed dissenting opinions. Justice Stevens was of the opinion that the impugned legis-
lation improperly extended the lengths of existing copyrights. Justice Breyer would 
have read the Copyright Clause of the Constitution in light of the First Amendment 
and held the statute unconstitutional.
52 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(23), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
App.II, No.5. 
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faced with the same issue as came before the American courts in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, would undertake an entirely different analysis than did its Amer-
ican counterpart in that case. 
In a constitutional challenge involving Canada’s freedom of speech 
constitutional provision, section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,53 and the Canadian federal government’s enactments with respect 
to copyright,54 Canada’s Supreme Court would begin directly with analysis 
of the impugned legislation in terms of the section 2(b) right to freedom 
of expression, in light of section 1 of the Charter 55 (which has no direct 
counterpart in the US Constitution), which makes Canada’s guaranteed 
rights and freedoms subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.56
The point here is twofold: first, neither in Canada nor in the US is 
the legislative arm of government, which is responsible for copyright, be-
yond the oversight of the courts in terms of constitutional challenges; and, 
second, the US Congress has been adjudged by the US Supreme Court to 
have a greater latitude before the courts will interfere than would probably 
be the case should the Canadian courts review the Canadian situation. It is 
the first point that reinforces the claim made in this discussion — that the 
role of the nation state is the most important in determining the environ-
ment of copyright in the digital age. In Canada and in the US, as in all 
countries,57 the law of the nation state will govern in any situation where 
53 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [Charter].
54 The Supreme Court of Canada, in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of 
Patents), 2002 SCC 76 at paras. 177–82 [the Harvard Mouse case in patent], Justice 
Bastarache for the majority, indicated a willingness to apply the Charter in an ap-
propriate statutory intellectual property case.
55 Charter, above note 53, s. 1, states that the freedoms set out in the Charter are subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can demonstrably be justified in 
a free and democratic society. The “Oakes test” has become the accepted approach 
to analysis of this section. It involves three elements: the government measures re-
stricting the freedom must be rationally connected to their objective(s); the measures 
should only impair the freedom minimally; and, the deleterious effects of the restric-
tion must be proportional to the benefits of the legislation being challenged. See R. 
v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.103.
56 Charter, ibid. 
57 This point is especially clear for countries, like Canada and the US, where treaties 
and agreements are never self-executing in domestic law, but must be implemented 
through enabling legislation. Because of issues involving the division of power in 
federated states like Canada and the US, federated states usually cannot be among 
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there is conflict between international treaties or agreements to which the 
country has made itself signatory and the enactments or constitution of the 
nation state itself.
In the US, the government has dramatically enlarged the reach and 
the power of the copyright holder over the past quarter century, while the 
exceptions to the rights of copyright holders legislated by Congress have 
remained largely static. In Canada, on the other hand, there has been no 
comparable enlargement of the copyright holders rights, in part because 
the scope of copyright was larger throughout the first three-quarters of the 
twentieth century, but also because Canada has not taken copyright legisla-
tion as far as the US has in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Mean-
while, in Canada, there has been a very clear articulation of users’ rights 
within the framework of the copyright legislation.58
2) The International Context of Copyright
There has been an international dimension to copyright law since the ear-
liest development of copyright itself. The two fundamental approaches 
to copyright developed in France59 and in England60 during a period of 
great international economic rivalry between the two states. Each system 
of national monopoly was designed to further the economic interests of its 
nation-state.61 The decision of the US, for centuries, to legislate copyright 
in ways that differed markedly from the emerging international norm was 
a decision of economic positioning in the international environment for 
the countries where treaties and agreements are self-executing. For example, in 
Canada, the federal government has most of the treaty-making capacity (see s. 132, 
taken together with the “peace, order and good government” language of s. 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, above note 52), but, if it involves Canada in a treaty in an area 
where it has no constitutional ability to make law, implementation of that treaty 
must necessarily await the legislative decisions of each of the provinces.
58 Wilkinson, “Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge,” above note 42. 
59 Droit d’auteur has been part of law in France since the French Revolution: see André 
Françon, Le Droit d’auteur: aspects internationaux et comparatifs (Cowansville, QC: 
Yvon Blais, 1993) at 121–22.
60 Copyright in England, beginning with the Statute of Anne, 1709 (U.K.), 8 Anne, c. 19.
61 See Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works: 1886–1986 (London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary Col-
lege, 1987) at liii (in the Preface).
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the emerging nation.62 As noted by Justice Estey in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1979, 
The United States statutes have not been based upon the international 
copyright treaties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, being the 
Berne Convention of 1886 and the Rome Copyright Convention of 1928, as 
the United States of America did not become signatories thereto. Indeed, 
it was not until the adoption by that country in 1955 of the Universal 
Copyright Convention of 1952 that the United States participated in the 
field of international copyright law other than by a collection of bilateral 
agreements.63
However, in the nineteenth century, a number of international initiatives 
involving information exchange began on a large scale.64 One of these, the 
Berne Convention of 1886,65 focused on the coordination of copyright between 
countries. Countries were free to join the Berne Convention, or not, and, even 
after having joined, were free to adopt newer versions of the convention if 
they wished66 — but they were also free not to do so. The US, for nearly a 
62 See Edward Samuels, The Illustrated Story of Copyright (New York: Thomas Dunne 
Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2000) at 7. The US created a form of copyright as early 
as 1790, but only for works created by Americans. It did not extend protection to for-
eign works until 1954, and even works by foreigners created in the US did not receive 
copyright protection until 1891.
63 Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 367 [Compo].
64 The International Telegraph Union (1865, Paris, now the International Telecom-
munications Union, see online: www.ITU.int/aboutitu/overview/landmarks.html.); 
the Universal Postal Union (begun with the Treaty of Berne, 1874, see online: www.
upu.int/about_us/en/history.html.); the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, 1883; and, most important in this context, the Berne Convention on 
copyright, below note 65 (1886).
65 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221, as last revised 24 July 1971. See online: www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. Canada adhered to this version on 26 June 1998 
[Berne Convention].
66 Including the Rome Convention of 1928, to which Justice Estey referred in the Compo 
decision, quoted above note 53.
332 Margaret Ann Wilkinson
century, chose not to join the Berne Union. Canada chose to be a part of the 
Berne Union,67 but to adhere to the convention at only the 1928 level.68
Meanwhile, in the context of international trade agreements, with the 
expansion of the Free Trade Agreement of 198969 into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)70 in 1994, Canada and the US first experienced 
the inclusion of intellectual property in a trade agreement with binding com-
mitments reinforced through a dispute resolution process.71 The intellectual 
property provisions of NAFTA were structured to include the Berne Conven-
tion by reference as the basis of the copyright provisions of the NAFTA and 
then make some additions in the text of NAFTA itself.72 It was the most 
recent level of the Berne Convention that was included (from 1978).73 Canada 
upgraded its legislation to reflect the 1978 version of the Berne Convention and 
eventually indicated its adherence to the later Berne Convention.74 The US, for 
the first time, became a member of the Berne Union.75
67 Indeed, Britain was a founding member of the Berne Union and agreed to its obliga-
tions immediately (see the International Copyright Act of 1886 (U.K.), 49 & 50 Vict., 
c. 33, which applied to Canada as a Dominion) and ratified the Berne Convention 
with effect from 5 December 1887.
68 Canada first became a signatory, in its own right, to the Berne Convention at the 
Rome Copyright Convention of 1928. The current Copyright Act was first passed by 
Parliament in 1921: S.C. 1921, c. 24. This Act was revised through An Act Amending 
the Copyright Act, 1923 (13–14 Geo. V, c. 10), which came into force in Canada on 1 
January 1924.
69 US and Canada, 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3 (entered into force 1 Janu-
ary 1989).
70 US, Canada, and Mexico, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2 (entered into 
force 12 January 1994) [NAFTA].
71 Mexico, the third member of NAFTA, also, of course, had the same experience.
72 The basis of other intellectual property provisions was the Paris Convention which, 
from 1883, had existed in the industrial property environment of patent, trademark, 
and unfair competition.
73 The Berne Convention 1886, which came into force on 5 December 1887, was followed 
by the Additional Act of Paris 1896, which came into force 9 December 1897, the 
Berlin Revision 1908, which came into force 9 September 1910, and was concluded 
by the Additional Protocol of Berne in 1914, which came into force 20 April 1915, 
the Rome Revision 1928, which came into force 1 August 1931, the Brussels Revision 
1948, which came into force 1 August 1951, the Stockholm Revision 1967, which, for 
its administrative sections only, came into force in 1970 but which, in terms of its 
substantive provisions, never came into force and was reviewed and replaced by the 
Paris Revision 1971, which came into force 10 October 1974.
74 Berne Convention, above note 65.
75 In 1989.
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The intellectual property provisions of NAFTA were swiftly emulated 
in the huge, multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO), of which both 
Canada and the US were founding members. The Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Agreement was a part of the WTO Agreement.76 Like 
the NAFTA, as well as containing provisions dealing with various aspects 
of intellectual property itself, TRIPS also incorporated, by reference, virtu-
ally all of the text of the Berne Convention.77 And, again, there is a binding 
dispute resolution process that forms part of the WTO.
The US lobbied successfully to ensure that TRIPS explicitly omits the 
requirement for adherence to article 6bis of the Berne Convention, but moral 
rights remain a part of the Berne Convention and NAFTA. The US, of course, 
is now signatory to the Berne Convention itself, but the Berne Convention has 
no sanctions against non-compliance such as exist in the international trade 
environment. Nevertheless, as described earlier, other countries, including 
Canada, make a much more robust effort to comply with the moral rights 
requirements of the Berne Convention than does the US.78 
Both NAFTA and TRIPS tend to privilege copyright holders over users. 
Each contains a version of the “three-step test,” which has become common 
in the international intellectual property environment recently.79 Article 13 
of TRIPS articulates the test as follows:80
Members [states] shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights
76 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1144 [TRIPS]. 
77 Note that art. 6bis of the Berne Convention, on moral rights, which is, by reference, 
part of NAFTA, was deliberately omitted from TRIPS: see art. 9(1).
78 Since NAFTA incorporates by reference art. 6bis of the Berne Convention on moral 
rights and has a reasonably robust dispute resolution mechanism and enforcement 
process, it is possible that the US could lose a challenge from Canada or Mexico on 
moral rights grounds at some future date should occasion arise. 
79 The “three-step test” originates in the Berne Convention — but there it appears only 
in connection with the right of reproduction (art. 9(2)). There is a version in NAFTA, 
art. 1709(6). A version also appears in the more recent WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 
December 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), art. 10, and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997), art. 30. 
80 See also TRIPS, above note 76, art. 30. Both NAFTA and TRIPS are discussed in 
this connection by Margaret Smith, “Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts under the World Trade Organization Agreements and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement” (1997), online: http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/
MR/mr145-e.htm#PROVISIONStxt.
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•	 To	certain	special	cases
•	 Which	do	not	conflict	with	a	normal	exploitation	of	the	work
•	 And	do	not	unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	right	
holder.
It may be noted that this language in the international instruments differs 
considerably from the language now prevalent in the Supreme Court of 
Canada with respect to copyright. Justice Binnie has written:
The proper balance . . . lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but 
in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it 
would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists . . . as it would be self-
defeating to undercompensate them . . . .81
Excessive control . . . may unduly limit the ability of the public do-
main to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term 
interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper util-
ization.82
And, in a case directly involving the digital environment, Justice Binnie 
wrote again, saying, 
Under the Copyright Act, the rights of the copyright owner and the lim-
itations on those rights should be read together to give “the fair and bal-
anced reading that befits remedial legislation” . . . .83
[The exception to the rights of the copyright holder at issue] is not a 
loophole but an important element of the balance struck by the statutory 
copyright scheme.84
81 Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 at para. 31.
82 Ibid. at para. 32.
83 Tariff 22, above note 2 at para. 88.
84 Ibid. at para. 89. Now it is true that by 2006, when the most recent copyright case, 
Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 [Robertson v. Thomson], was decided, the 
Supreme Court that had decided the earlier 2004 copyright decisions had changed 
in composition: Justices Iacobucci, Major, and Arbour have been replaced by Justices 
Abella, Charron, and Rothstein. Whereas the Court’s decisions in CCH v. Law 
Society, above note 38, and Tariff 22, ibid., were virtually unanimous (Justice LeBel 
wrote a separate judgment in Tariff 22 in which he was the only justice to raise 
privacy concerns), the most recent decision in 2006 was a close 5:4 split decision. In 
Robertson v. Thomson, Justices LeBel and Fish wrote for the majority, with Justices 
Rothstein, Bastarache, and Deschamps joining. Justice Abella wrote for the minor-
ity, joined by Chief Justice McLachlin (the author of the unanimous judgment in 
CCH v. Law Society), and Justice Binnie (author of the majority judgments in the 
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The discrepancies between the kind of balancing language being used by 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the rightsholder-dominated language 
of the international trade agreements to which Canada is a party may soon 
place the Canadian government in a challenging position. 
International agreements, once entered into, are perceived as limiting 
domestic national policy options, although public international law pro-
vides few effective sanctions where a nation state fails to live up to its inter-
national commitments. Certainly the migration of intellectual property 
into the international trade environment has upped the stakes for member 
nations, like Canada, since non-compliance puts a nation at risk of trade 
sanctions. Even so, international commitments are not binding on Canada’s 
legislatures. On the other hand, if Canada’s attempts to implement legisla-
tion to put it in compliance with its trade obligations run afoul of Canada’s 
Constitution, the courts will strike down that legislation. International 
trade obligations are irrelevant to Charter concerns. 
The use by Canada’s Chief Justice of “rights” language in discussing the 
place of users in the copyright environment gives additional weight to con-
cerns that further erosion of users’ rights or exceptions to copyright holders’ 
rights in Canada’s copyright legislation will engender Charter scrutiny, fo-
cused on the right to freedom of expression, by the courts. Because of this, 
and despite grumbling from the foreign parties citing TRIPS or NAFTA, 
the users’ rights currently in place in Canada’s Copyright Act seem robust 
and likely to continue.85
Thus it seems likely that the differences between Canada and the US 
in terms of the copyright environment surrounding copyright holders and 
2002 Théberge decision, above note 81 (a 4:3 split) and in the Tariff 22 decision) and 
Justice Charron. The majority in Robertson v. Thomson says that the “process” is not 
important to its decision — just the “context” of the presentation of the works at 
issue, and in this way it distinguishes the approach of the earlier Supreme Court in 
Tariff 22. The minority in Robertson v. Thomson says the “process” approach should 
have been used. The issue in Robertson v. Thomson did not involve users’ rights dir-
ectly, although the public ultimately consumes the newspapers and online products 
that were at issue: the lis was between contributors to the newspaper and the news-
paper publisher.
85 Bill C-60 of the previous Conservative administration fell when the government 
called the last election. There have been rumours of new copyright legislation for 
several years now but introduction of any bill has been long-delayed in the current 
minority government situation. There was a bill before the House of Commons, Bill 
C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Bill, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2008 (first reading 17 
June 2008), which also fell because of an election call.
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users are likely to continue to exist, despite international pressures for con-
formity amongst nations, because of differences in constitutions and na-
tional character. Given that likelihood, what is the future for “open access” 
philanthropy in the two nations?
E. OPEN ACCESS IN CANADA AND IN THE US
One problem that the open access movement has encountered as it has 
branched out from the US is that in most countries there is a second set 
of rights involved in the copyright environment — the moral rights. Moral 
rights do not necessarily lie with the holder of the economic rights in copy-
right. In some cases, the author of a work, who is the holder of the moral 
rights,86 can frustrate the exercise of validly held economic rights in a work.87 
Thus, acting alone, the philanthropy of the holder of the economic rights in 
most countries may not be enough to secure for users the right to use the 
material.88 In the US, however, since it is generally agreed that the moral 
rights are largely absent from the copyright environment,89 when a copyright 
86 The period of moral rights protection varies from country to country. In Canada the 
period of protection for the moral rights is the same as the period of protection for 
the economic rights. Thus, for the author’s lifetime, the author is the owner of the 
moral rights — but for the fifty-year period following the death of the author, the 
author’s heirs are the owners. In Canada, while the moral rights cannot be assigned, 
they can be waived (see Copyright Act, above note 6, s. 14.1(2)), but in other jurisdic-
tions, waiver is not permitted (in France, for example, as in most European countries, 
moral rights are “perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptable,” quoted by Charles R. 
Beitz from the French Intellectual Property Code, L121-1 found in UNESCO Copyright 
Laws and Treaties of the World, vol. 1, in “The Moral Rights of Creators of Artistic and 
Literary Works” (2005) 13(3) J. of Political Philosophy 330 at 332).
87 For example, the holder of the economic right to public display of an artwork could 
give permission for display of a work but the exercise by the author of her moral 
right to not have the work associated with products, services, causes, or institutions 
that would prejudice her honour or reputation could frustrate the efforts of a user to 
put together a public display which included that artwork.
88 This reality is explicitly acknowledged in the Canadian version of the Creative Com-
mons licence: online, www.creativecommons.ca.
89 J.A.L. Sterling notes that the inclusion of moral rights protection in the Berne Con-
vention after 1928 was one of the stumbling blocks for many years for the US (J.A.L. 
Sterling, World Copyright Law: Protection of Authors’ Works, Performances, Phono-
grams, Films, Video, Broadcasts and Published Editions in National, International and 
Regional Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 280). The US, since joining the 
Berne Union, has passed a very limited law in the moral rights area, providing a 
right of integrity to certain defined groups of artists: Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990, 
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holder donates the economic interest to users, it is enough to permit the user 
to use the material as specified by the donor of the economic interest.90
Another challenge for the open-access movement in Canada is that 
the philanthropy of the copyright holder is unnecessary when either the 
material that is sought to be used does not attract copyright protection in 
Canada91 or, in the case of material that is in copyright in Canada, users are 
guaranteed a right of access and certain uses of works pursuant to the users’ 
rights aspects of the Copyright Act.
The final challenge for the open-access movement in Canada is the 
reach of the collective regime in Canada. If, as discussed above, Canada 
is operating under an extended repertoire or extended licence regime, the 
existence of a collective licence with an appropriate collective will protect 
any user from liability for infringement even from a non-member and will 
thus render redundant the efforts of copyright holders, such as those using 
the Creative Commons licence approach, to individually licence uses that 
are deemed to be administered by the recognized collectives. The open-
access permissions would only be relevant for those users who did not have 
blanket licences in place.
If, on the other hand, Canada is not operating under an extended reper-
toire regime, then all users, even users with collective licences, will be able to 
breathe more easily about those rightsholders not represented by the collect-
ive, where it can be established that those “unrepresented” rights holders have 
publicly “donated” their rights. In this event, the public access movement 
would still provide some value in the Canadian blanket-licence context.
In either case, whether Canada is an extended licensing regime or not, 
if enough rightsholders decide to be philanthropic and donate their rights, 
Pub. L. No. 101-650, H.R. 5316, 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Even within this ambit of this 
law, however, the moral rights can be waived: see § 106A(e)(1).
90 Interestingly though, the American version of the Creative Commons licence, 
like others, including the Canadian, mentions moral rights toward the end of the 
contract and explicitly states that the licence does not cover them: see online: http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by_sa/3.0/US/.
91 Recall that all material in Canada, regardless of source or form, has a shorter term of 
protection than the life-plus-seventy-years term that is now the norm in the US. For 
any material being dealt with in Canada, the maximum possible term of protection 
is only the life of the author plus fifty years. Recall also that the courts in Canada 
have recognized the doctrine of merger and will not find a copyright interest where 
the expression of the idea is the only, or one of the only, ways to express a particular 
idea. And, finally, recall that Canada has not enacted legislation to protect databases 
and digital rights management as the United States has.
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it would seem to be more efficient and better aligned with the Canadian 
copyright environment if those copyright holders formed a new collective 
of like-minded rightsholders that could be recognized under the Act.92 This 
would be possible even where there are collectives representing rightshold-
ers in a particular market (since more than one organization can be recog-
nized in a particular market).93 In the electronic rights environment there is 
not at present a collective in place for literary works,94 for example. In the 
music environment there is.95 In either case there would be room and a role 
for a philanthropically based collective of rightsholders.
92 A “collective society” is defined in s. 2 of the Canadian Copyright Act, above note 6, as 
a society, association or corporation that carries on the business of collective ad-
ministration of copyright. . . for the benefit of those who, by assignment, grant of 
licence, appointment of it as their agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on their 
behalf in relation to that collective administration, and (a) operates a licensing 
scheme, applicable in relation to a repertoire of works . . . of more than one au-
thor . . . pursuant to which the society, association or corporation sets out classes 
of uses that it agrees to authorize under this Act, and the royalties and terms and 
conditions on which it agrees to authorize those classes of uses . . . .
This definition was added to the Copyright Act in 1997, see S.C. 1997, c. 24. There 
are at least four different systems of administration in relation to collective societies 
legislated in the Canadian Copyright Act. For administration of rights in works 
generally s. 70.1 addresses 
a collective society that operates (a) a licensing scheme, applicable in relation to 
a repertoire of works of more than one author, pursuant to which the society sets 
out the classes of uses for which and the royalties and terms and conditions on 
which it agrees to authorize the doing of an act mentioned in section 3 in respect 
of those works . . . .
Such a collective does not need to have its tariff set by the Board. In the case of the 
philanthropic collective proposed here, the collective could set its royalties at $0 and, 
pursuant to s. 70.12, “for the purpose of setting out by licence the royalties and terms 
and conditions relating to classes of uses . . . (b) enter into agreements with users.”
93 Although the Copyright Board frowns upon this practice, it is obviously con-
templated by the legislation: see, for example, ibid., s. 38.2(2) which assumes the 
possibility of multiple reprographic societies. See also Mario Bouchard, “Collective 
Management in Commonwealth Jurisdictions: Comparing Canada with Australia” 
in Daniel Gervais, ed., Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, above 
note 46, 283 at 286.
94 Thus, for the moment, a user must locate and approach each individual rightsholder 
in order, for example, to get permission to post materials in copyright in Canada to 
the Internet.
95 SOCAN administers this right on behalf of its members: see Tariff 22, above note 2.
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The “philanthropic” collective would become part of the dominant 
landscape of copyright ownership in Canada and be visible in that connec-
tion to users, as well as recognizable to policy-makers and administrators 
in government.96 Moreover, in an adjudication involving tariffs, the exist-
ence of the “philanthropic” collective that was donating its permissions and 
licences would be squarely before the Copyright Board of Canada as it set 
the “fair” tariff for any other collective in a particular sector. 
Even if those interested in pursuing the philanthropic approach in 
Canada do not create a collective, at the very least, in order to affect the 
economics of the copyright environment in Canada, when the Copyright 
Board is considering any tariff where there is active open access activity in 
the sector, evidence of the rate of participation in the open access move-
ment (such as numbers of Creative Commons licences issued in Canada for 
a particular sector represented otherwise by the applicant collective) should 
be made available to the Copyright Board to take into account when estab-
lishing the tariff for the corresponding collective. 
F. CONCLUSION
Although there has long been an international dimension to copyright, it 
is, at the end of the day, a matter for the jurisdiction of individual na-
tion states. Governments within those nation states will find themselves 
bounded in copyright decision making by a number of factors: their na-
96 As the legislative environment in Canada continues to evolve, such a philanthropic 
collective would be able to take advantage of all the provisions of the Copyright Act 
provided for collectives and users holding licences from it would also receive all the 
statutory benefits flowing to those with relationships with collectives. For example, 
in the current Copyright Act, educational institutions who have licences from 
reprographic collectives receive the benefit of s. 30.3 whereas others do not (although 
that particular benefit is probably rendered moot by the interpretation of the fair 
dealing provisions by the Supreme Court in CCH v. Law Society, above note 38: see 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge,” 
above note 42). It has also become common practice for copyright collectives to rou-
tinely register the interests of their rightsholders in the Copyright Register (although 
registration is not required, it does have some evidentiary advantages under the 
Copyright Act). Should the proposed philanthropic collective take up this practice, or 
at least make information about its repertoire available to users, it would help users 
by providing an increased collection of information about the state of copyright in 
Canada.
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tional histories and traditions, their international agreements, but, perhaps 
most controlling in many circumstances, their constitutions. 
Although Canada and the US now have similar international com-
mitments in the copyright area, their national histories and traditions are 
dissimilar (and, most especially to this analysis, dissimilar in the realm of 
copyright) and their constitutions differ with respect to copyright. These dif-
ferences mean that the role that copyright holders play by philanthropically 
participating in the open access movement is different in the two countries. 
Although providing access to users through the philanthropic activities 
of copyright holders fits well within the context of the current international 
trade environment for copyright, it does not guarantee users permanent, 
free, and universal access to information in the way that legislated users’ 
rights provide those guarantees. 
Canada’s current copyright environment is more balanced than the cur-
rent American situation, explicitly providing three sets of rights: for copyright 
holders, for moral rightsholders, and for users. The American environment 
has become dramatically tipped toward control by copyright holders over 
the past twenty years. Given the balance of interests represented in the Can-
adian legal environment, there is less of a role for copyright holders’ philan-
thropy. This is consistent with Canada’s historic nature and probably best in 
line with its constitutional priorities. On the other hand, the US Supreme 
Court has already ruled that Congress has latitude to establish the copyright 
environment in the US and that measures taken by the US (exceeding even 
the copyright-holder-dominated requirements of the current international 
trade agreements) are constitutional. In the American environment, then, 
the copyright-holder-based philanthropy of the open access movement is 
critical to user access and it is indeed fortunate that philanthropy has such a 
strong and enduring presence in American society.
In Canada, it is suggested that those copyright holders interested in 
philanthropic aims explore the option of creating a collective, rather than 
simply adopting open access initiatives generated from the US. Because of 
the impact of collectives in Canada and the enlarged regime of legislated 
users’ rights, individual philanthropic gestures through open source licens-
ing using, for example, the Creative Commons licence will be lost, or at 
least diminished, in the Canadian context. A philanthropically based col-
lective in the Canadian context, on the other hand, could have a greater 
impact on the copyright environment for Canadian users.
